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Abstract. This paper gives a new example of exploiting the idea of
using polynomials with restricted coefficients over finite fields and rings
to construct reliable cryptosystems and identification schemes.
1 Overview
The recently discovered idea of using polynomials with restricted
coefficients in cryptography has already found several cryptographic
applications such as the NTRU cryptosystem [7], the ENROOT
cryptosystem [4] and the PASS identification scheme [6]; see also [5].
In contrast to the constructions ofNTRU andPASS, which consider
classes of polynomials of low degree with many “small” non-zero
coefficients, ENROOT introduced a public key cryptosystem where
the polynomials are of high degree, but extremely sparse. In this
paper, we give a new application of this idea to the design of a fast
and reliable identification scheme.
Let q be a prime power and let IFq be the finite field of q elements.
Given a set S ⊆ IFq, we say that a polynomialG(X) ∈ IFq[X] is an S-
polynomial if every coefficient of G belongs to S, and we say that it is
an essentially S-polynomial if G(X)−G(0) is an S-polynomial. (This
notation is somewhat reminiscent of the idea of S-units in number
theory, and is not related to constructions in algebraic geometry.)
Finally, we say that a polynomial G(X) ∈ IFq[X] is τ -sparse if it has
at most τ non-zero coefficients.
Throughout this paper log z denotes the binary logarithm of z.
The “hard” problem underlying our one-way functions can be stated
as follows:
Given 2m arbitrary elements α1, . . . αm, γ1, . . . , γm ∈ IFq and
a set S ⊆ IFq of small cardinality, it is unfeasible to find a
τ -sparse S-polynomial G(X) ∈ IFq[X] of degree degG ≤ q−1
such that G(αj) = γj for j = 1, . . . , m, provided that q is of
“medium” size relative to the choice of m ≥ 1 and τ ≥ 3.
More precisely, we expect that if one fixes the number of points m,
the cardinality |S| and the sparsity τ ≥ 3, then the problem requires
exponential time as q →∞. Of course, we mean exponential time in
the bit length of q, that is, in log q.
Indeed, consider the special case q = p, where p is a prime num-
ber. Let aij ≡ α
i
j (mod p) and cj ≡ γj (mod p) be chosen so that
0 ≤ aij, cj ≤ p−1 for i = 0, . . . , p−1 and j = 1, . . . , m. In this (sim-
plified!) case, the hard problem above is still equivalent to the hard
problem of finding a feasible solution to the integer programming
problem
p−1∑
i=0
xiεiaij + yjp = cj , j = 1, . . . , m,
p−1∑
i=0
εi ≤ τ,
where yj ∈ ZZ, xi ∈ S, and εi ∈ {0, 1} for all i and j.
2 Basic Idea
Let us fix the finite field IFq and some integer parameters k ≥ 1 and
r, s, t ≥ 2.
To create the signature Alice uses the following algorithm – which
we denote SPIFI, for Secure Polynomial IdentiFIcation.
Initial Set-up
Step 1
Select at random k distinct elements a0, . . . ak−1 ∈ IFq and a
random t-sparse {0, 1}-polynomial ϕ(X) ∈ IFq[X] of degree at
most q − 1 and with ϕ(0) = 0.
Step 2
Compute A = −ϕ(a0), and put f(X) = ϕ(X)+A. Thus f is a t-
sparse essentially {0, 1}-polynomial with f(a0) = 0 and f(0) = A.
Step 3
Compute Cj = f(aj), j = 1, . . . , k − 1.
Step 4
Make the values of A, a0, . . . ak−1 and C1, . . . , Ck−1 public.
To verify Alice’s identity, Alice and Bob use the following procedure:
Verification Protocol
Step 1
Bob selects at random an s-sparse essentially {0, 1}-polynomial
h(X) ∈ IFq[X] with h(0) = B and sends it to Alice.
Step 2
Alice selects at random an r-sparse {0, 1}-polynomial g(X) ∈
IFq[X] of degree at most q − 1 with g(0) = 1.
Step 3
Alice computes
F (X) ≡ f(X)g(X)h(X) (mod Xq −X)
and
Dj = g(aj), j = 1, . . . , k − 1,
and sends the polynomial F and D1, . . . , Dk−1 to Bob.
Step 4
Bob computes
Ej = h(aj), j = 1, . . . , k − 1,
and verifies that F (X) is an rst-sparse {0, 1, A,B,AB}-polyno-
mial with F (0) = AB, and
F (aj) = CjDjEj , j = 0, . . . , k − 1,
where D0 = E0 = 1, C0 = 0.
Of course, there is a negligible chance that the constructed poly-
nomial F (X) is not a {0, 1, A,B,AB}-polynomial, however if rst is
substantially smaller than q this chance is extremely small (and in
this case Alice and Bob can always repeat the procedure).
The sparsity of the polynomials involved guarantees the computa-
tional efficiency of this scheme.
In particular, using repeated squaring one can compute any power
ae with a ∈ IFq and an integer e, 0 ≤ e ≤ q − 1, in about 2 log q
arithmetic operations in IFq in the worst case and about 1.5 log q
arithmetic operations on average; see Section 1.3 of [1], Section 4.3
of [2], or Section 2.1 of [3]. Thus any τ -sparse G(X) ∈ IFq[X] can be
evaluated at any point in about O(τ log q) arithmetic operations in
IFq.
It is also well known that any element of IFq can be encoded by using
about log q bits.
Finally, we remark that if 0 ∈ S ⊆ IFq then any τ -sparse S-polyno-
mial G(X) ∈ IFq[X] of degree at most q − 1 can be encoded with
about τ log(q|S|−q) bits. Indeed, we have to identify at most τ posi-
tions at which G has a non-zero coefficient. Encoding of each position
requires about log q bits. For each such position, about log(|S| − 1)
bits are then required to determine the corresponding element of S.
For example, the signature must encode rst positions of the poly-
nomial F (corresponding to its non-zero coefficients), which takes
about rst log q bits. Each position requires two additional bits to
distinguish between the possible coefficients 1, A, B and AB. The
encoding of D1, ..., Dk−1 requires about (k − 1) log q bits. Thus, the
total signature size is (rst+ k − 1) log q + 2rst bits.
Putting everything together, after simple calculations we derive that,
using the naive repeated squaring exponentiation,
◦ the initial set-up takes O(kt log q) arithmetic operations in IFq;
◦ the private key size is about (t+ 1) log q bits;
◦ the public key size is about 2k log q bits;
◦ signature generation, that is, computation of the polynomial F
and elements Dj , j = 0, . . . , k − 1, takes O(rst) arithmetic oper-
ations with integers in the range [0, 2q− 2] and O ((k − 1)r log q)
arithmetic operations in IFq;
◦ the signature size is about (rst+ k − 1) log q + 2rst bits;
◦ signature verification, that is, computation F (aj) and the prod-
ucts CjDjEj, j = 0, . . . , k − 1, takes about O (ksrt log q) arith-
metic operations in IFq.
We remark that the practical and asymptotic performance of this
scheme can be improved if one uses more sophisticated algorithms
to evaluate powers and sparse polynomials; see [1–3, 9, 11]. In partic-
ular, one can use precomputation of certain powers of the aj ’s and
several other clever tricks which we do not consider in this paper.
3 Possible Attacks
It is clear that recovering or faking the private key (that is, finding
a t-sparse essentially {0, 1}-polynomial polynomial f˜(X) ∈ IFq[X]
with f˜(0) = A, and f˜(aj) = Cj , j = 0, . . . , k − 1, C0 = 0) or
faking the signature (that is, finding a rst-sparse {0, 1, A,B,AB}-
polynomial F˜ (X) ∈ IFq[X] with F˜ (0) = AB, and F˜ (aj) = CjDjEj ,
j = 0, . . . , k− 1) represent the same problem (with slightly different
parameters).
We also remark that that without the reduction
f(X)g(X)h(X) (mod Xq −X),
one of the one possible attacks would be via polynomial factoriza-
tion. In particular, in a practical implementation of this scheme, one
should make sure that both f and g have terms of degree greater
than q/2 (so there are some reductions). Moreover, even without the
reduction modulo Xq−X, the factorization attack does not seem to
be feasible because of the large degrees of the polynomials involved;
all known factorization algorithms (as well as their important com-
ponents such as irreducibility testing and the greatest common di-
visor algorithms) do not take advantage of sparsity or any special
structure of the coefficients; see [2, 10]. In fact the first factor any
of this algorithms will find will be the trivial one, that is, X − a0.
However the quotient F (X)/(X − a0) is most likely neither sparse
nor a {0, 1}-polynomial.
It is also possible that by using some “clever” choice of polynomials
h, after several rounds of identification, Bob will be able to gain some
information about f . Although the polynomials g are supposed to
prevent him from doing this, in the next section we present another
idea, which can be applied to other situations and which should make
this attack completely unfeasible.
One might also consider lattice attacks. In the abstract, they could
succeed, but since the dimension of the lattice would be equal to
the (very large) degree of the polynomials involved, any such attack
would be completely unfeasable. In particular, with current technol-
ogy one can reduce lattices of degrees in the hundreds, while our
lattices will have dimension roughly 231.
Finally, the probability of success in a brute force attack to discover
or fake the signature, when the attacker selects a random rst-sparse
{0, 1, A,B,AB}-polynomial F˜ (X) ∈ IFq[X] with F˜ (0) = AB that
verifies only if F˜ (aj) = CjDjEj, j = 0, . . . , k − 1, is about
min
4−rst+1
(
q − 1
rst− 1
)
−1
, q−k
 .
Similarly, the probability of randomly guessing or faking the private
key f is
min

(
q − 1
t− 1
)
−1
, q−k
 .
In particular, we do not see any security flaws in this scheme even if
k = 1. While the choice k = 1 has the obvious advantage of minimiz-
ing the signature size (in this case, Alice sends only the polynomial
F ), in order to provide the required level of security, quite large
values of q must be used. From a practical standpoint, it is very
convenient to work in the field with p = 231 − 1 elements. Thus,
to guarantee the 290 level of security, which is currently accepted
as standard, it is better to take k ≥ 3. We believe that the choices
q = p = 231 − 1, r = s = t = 5, and k = 3 provide a fast, short
(about 4200 bits long), and reliable signature.
4 Modification of the Basic Scheme
To prevent Bob from gaining any useful information about f by
selecting some special polynomials h, Alice can select a ∈ IFq and
two t-sparse essentially {0, 1}-polynomials f1(X), f2(X) ∈ IFq[X] of
degree at most q−1 which for some A,C1, . . . , Ck−1 ∈ IFq and distinct
a0, . . . , ak−1 ∈ IFq satisfy the conditions
f1(0) = f2(0) = A (1)
and
f1(aj) = f2(aj) = Cj, j = 0, . . . , k − 1, (2)
where C0 = 0.
To do so, Alice selects a certain parameter n < t, considers random
{−1, 1}-polynomials ψ(X) and tries to find a root of this polynomial
over IFq. For values of n of reasonable size this can be done quite
efficiently, at least in probabilistic polynomial time; see [2, 10].
It follows from Theorem 3 of [8] that for sufficiently large q the
probability of a monic polynomial of degree n over IFq having k
distinct roots in IFq is
Pk(n, q) =
∞∑
m=k
(
q
m
)
q−m
n−m∑
l=0
(−1)l
(
q −m
l
)
q−l.
In particular,
lim
n→∞
lim
q→∞
Pk(n, q) =
1
k ! ek
.
Therefore, after O(k!ek) Alice will find with high probability an n-
sparse {−1, 1}-polynomial ψ(X) ∈ IFq[X], having k distinct roots
a0, . . . , ak−1 ∈ IFq. Then she can write Xψ(X) = ϕ1(X) − ϕ2(X)
where ϕ1, ϕ2 are {0, 1}-polynomials. Obviously,
ϕ1(aj) = ϕ2(aj), j = 0, . . . , k − 1,
and
ϕ1(0) = ϕ2(0) = 0
Then Alice selects a random (t−n)-sparse {0, 1}-polynomial ϕ(X) ∈
IFq[X] of degree at most q − 1 and with ϕ(0) = 0 Now Alice puts
fi(X) = ϕ(X) + ϕi(X) + A, i = 1, 2,
where
A = −ϕ(a0)− ϕ1(a0) = −ϕ(a0)− ϕ2(a0).
Thus f1 and f2 are t-sparse essentially {0, 1}-polynomials which sat-
isfy (1) and (2). Therefore, now Alice can alternate f1 and f2 in a
random order.
Instead of the sum ϕ(X)+ϕi(X), i = 1, 2, one can also consider more
complicated linear combinations with {0, 1}-polynomial coefficients.
For example, one can put
fi(X) = ϕ(X) + ψ(X)ϕi(X) + A, i = 1, 2,
for a random {0, 1}-polynomial φ(X) ∈ IFq[X] and
A = −ϕ(a0)− ψ(a0)ϕ1(a0) = −ϕ(a0)− ψ(a0)ϕ2(a0).
5 Concluding Remarks
It is natural to try to construct and use more than two t-sparse
essentially {0, 1}-polynomials which take the same value at k distinct
points. However our approach of Section 4 does not seem to extend
to this case.
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